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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2902 
___________ 
 
RONALD MEJIA BRAVO, 
a/k/a Ronald Adrian Mejia Bravo, 
a/k/a Ronal Mejia Bravo, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094 380 974 ) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 12, 2014 
Before: JORDAN, SLOVITER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 17, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Ronald Bravo petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals denying his motion to reconsider.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
 Bravo is a native and citizen of Nicaragua.  In 2010, the Department of Homeland 
Security issued a notice to appear charging that he was subject to removal from the 
United States because he was present without having been admitted or paroled.  Bravo, 
through counsel, conceded that he is removable as charged.  He applied for withholding 
of removal and relief under the Convention against Torture (“CAT”). 
 In support of his applications, Bravo testified that he worked as a driver of a small 
bus in Nicaragua.  On October 23, 2000, he was approached by members of the Mara 18 
gang.  The gang members threatened him and told him to join the gang so that they could 
rob his passengers.  Bravo refused and the gang members said that if he went to the 
police he would have problems.  Bravo filed a complaint with the police but he does not 
know if the police responded.  The gang continued to harass him.   
 Bravo also testified that on January 15, 2001, one of the gang members tried to 
shoot him.  Bravo ran and then left his home and went to live with his aunt and uncle.  He 
also filed a complaint with the police.  Bravo stayed at his aunt and uncle’s house until he 
came to the United States in April 2002.  Bravo testified that gang members threatened 
his brother after he left Nicaragua and asked about his whereabouts.  He stated that he 
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does not believe the police will protect him because they did not respond to his 
complaints.     
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Bravo’s application for withholding of 
removal.  The IJ reviewed Bravo’s corroborating evidence and found it “somewhat 
scanty.”  IJ Dec. at 18.  The IJ found Bravo credible, but concluded that his claim failed 
for several reasons.  The IJ explained that Bravo is not a member of a particular social 
group and thus was not threatened on account of a protected ground, that he did not 
establish past persecution based on the two incidents, and that he had not established a 
well-founded fear of persecution because he had not shown that anyone is looking for 
him.  The IJ stated that Bravo failed to corroborate his testimony that his brother had 
been threatened after he left the country.  The IJ also denied relief under the CAT. 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Bravo’s appeal.  The BIA 
stated that it agreed with the IJ that Bravo’s credible testimony was insufficient to meet 
his burden of proof.  The BIA explained that Bravo had provided police reports, but that 
he had not provided a letter from his mother, who lives in the United States, verifying 
that she had obtained the reports on a visit to Nicaragua after he entered the United 
States.  The BIA also noted that, while Bravo testified that he had reported the two 
incidents when each occurred, the two police reports were issued on the same day.   
 The BIA also agreed with the IJ that Bravo should have corroborated any 
communication that his brother had with gang members since his departure.  The BIA 
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stated that it had considered the background evidence and found that conditions in 
Nicaragua were not as Bravo had described them in his brief.  Finally, the BIA ruled that 
Bravo did not show that he is entitled to relief under the CAT.    
 Bravo did not file a petition for review but, through counsel, filed a timely motion 
to reconsider.  Bravo asserted that the BIA had erred in requiring an affidavit from his 
mother to corroborate the police reports where there was no question as to their 
legitimacy.  In addition, Bravo argued that the police reports reflect that he reported the 
incidents on different days.  Bravo also argued that the BIA had “cherry-picked” the 
reports it cited about conditions in Nicaragua.  The BIA denied the motion to reconsider 
because Bravo did not identify any material error of fact or law in its prior decision.  This 
petition for review followed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the BIA’s denial 
of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion.  Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 
(3d Cir. 2012).  The BIA abuses its discretion where it acts in a manner that is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to the law.”  Id. at 365 (citation omitted).      
 Bravo has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion.  In denying the motion to 
reconsider, the BIA explained, and the record reflects, that Bravo argued in his initial 
appeal that the police reports were sufficient to corroborate his claim.  As noted above, 
the BIA ruled that Bravo had not met his burden of proof in part because he had not 
provided a statement from his mother, who had obtained the police reports on a visit to 
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Nicaragua after he entered the United States.  The BIA noted that Bravo’s mother lives in 
the United States and that her statement was easy to obtain.  On reconsideration, the BIA 
again found it reasonable to expect Bravo to submit corroboration from his mother. 
 Bravo contends that a letter from his mother would not add anything to his case, 
but he has not shown that the BIA’s conclusion is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.    
Bravo has not shown that it was unreasonable to expect his mother to verify that she 
obtained the reports from the police.  The fact that Bravo reported the incidents to the 
police is central to his claim.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(noting BIA decisions establish that it is reasonable to expect an applicant to corroborate 
facts that are central to his claim and easily verified).1 
  The BIA also rejected Bravo’s argument that it committed an error of fact by 
stating that the police reports contradicted his claim that he reported the two incidents 
immediately after each occurred because the reports were issued on the same day.  The 
BIA stated that, even if the reports were not issued on the same day, Bravo had not 
shown that the error is material.  Although the BIA did not further discuss this 
conclusion, its initial decision reflects that a mistaken belief that the police reports were 
issued the same day did not play much of a part (if any) in its conclusion that Bravo did  
                                              
1Bravo also argues that the IJ violated the rule in Abdulai by failing to ask him why he 
did not obtain his mother’s statement.  Bravo, however, did not raise this argument in his 
motion to reconsider and we may not consider it.  Castro, 671 F.3d at 364.  Similarly, we 
do not consider any other issues raised in Bravo’s brief that were not raised in his motion 
to reconsider or addressed in the BIA’s decision denying reconsideration. 
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not adequately corroborate his claim.  We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of 
reconsideration in this regard. 
 Bravo also has not shown that the BIA erred in rejecting his argument that it 
“cherry-picked” from the background evidence.  In its initial decision, the BIA quoted 
from the background evidence to support its conclusion that conditions in Nicaragua were 
not as dangerous as Bravo had described in his brief.  Bravo argued in his motion to 
reconsider that the reports reflect that Nicaragua is “plagued by rampant violence with [a] 
little police force that is ineffectually equipped to deal with widespread violence.”  A.R. 
at 10.  In denying reconsideration, the BIA explained that it had fully considered the 
evidence and properly concluded that it was insufficient to support his claim for relief.  
We do not find the BIA’s decision arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Although 
Bravo points in his brief to evidence showing that there are problems with the police 
force in Nicaragua, as noted in the BIA’s initial decision, there is also evidence reflecting 
that the police are committed to fighting organized crime.   
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
